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Abstract. Choi et al. recently proposed an efficient RFID authentica-
tion protocol for a ubiquitous computing environment, OHLCAP(One-
Way Hash based Low-Cost Authentication Protocol). However, this pa-
per reveals that the protocol has several security weaknesses : 1) trace-
ability based on the leakage of counter information, 2) vulnerability to
an impersonation attack by maliciously updating a random number, and
3) traceability based on a physically-attacked tag. Finally, a security en-
hanced group-based authentication protocol is presented.
Keywords: RFID system, group-based authentication, indistinguisha-
bility, traceability.
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification(RFID) systems, consisting of RFID tags, an
RFID reader, and back-end database, are expected to replace optical bar codes
due to several advantages, such as their low cost, small size, quick identification,
and embedded implementation into objects. However, communication using the
RF signal between a tag and a reader can create new threats to the security and
privacy of a RFID tag, including the leakage of privacy, location tracing, and
tag or reader impersonation.
Various attempts have already been made to protect the privacy of a tag
using physical technology, such as the ‘Kill command’ [12], ‘Active jamming’
[5], and ‘Blocker tag’ [5] approaches. However, none have been successful. As a
cryptographic solution, Weis et al. [10–12] proposed a hash-lock protocol and ran-
domized hash-lock protocol. Yet, with the hash-lock protocol, since the metaID
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is unique for each tag, location privacy is compromised due to the fixed metaID.
Meanwhile, with the randomized hash-lock protocol, the identity of a tag, IDk is
transmitted from the reader to the tag, making the system vulnerable to a replay
attack, spoofing attack, and location tracing. Henrici and Mu¨ller [4] proposed
an ID variation protocol, that is secure against a replay attack, yet location
privacy is compromised as the tag’s response remains constant until the next
authentication session when desynchronization occurs [8]. Ohkubo et al. [7] pro-
posed a hash chain-based authentication protocol in which the reader sends a
query using two different hash functions, however this scheme is still vulnera-
ble to a replay attack and spoofing attack. In 2005, Lee et al. [6] proposed a
low-cost RFID authentication scheme in which a tag and the back-end database
only perform two one-way hash operations, yet this scheme is still vulnerable
to a spoofing attack and location-tracing attack when desynchronization occurs.
More recently, Choi et al. [1] proposed an efficient RFID authentication protocol
for a ubiquitous computing environment, where the tag’s ID is static. In [1], the
authors claim that their protocol guarantees location privacy due to the use of
fresh values in every session, plus an adversary cannot trace the target tag using
a physical attack, even when certain secret values are obtained.
However, this paper shows that the protocol developed by Choi et al. still
has security weaknesses. First, an adversary can trace a tag using leaked counter
information. Second, an adversary can impersonate a reader by maliciously up-
dating the random number obtained from the previous session. Finally, in the
case of a physically attacked tag, an adversary can easily trace a target tag.
Therefore, a low-cost authentication protocol that enhances OHLCAP is pro-
posed to protect against the above attacks.
2 Security Threats to RFID system
An RFID system usually consists of three parts: RFID tags(transponders), the
RFID reader(transceiver), and back-end database(Back-end server). An RFID
tag includes a microchip for computing and a coupling element, such as an an-
tenna, for communication with the RFID reader. The RFID reader interrogates
the tags using an RF signal, then transmits the collected data to the back-end
database. However, the channel between the reader and a tag is insecure, as it
is based on wireless communication. After the back-end database receives the
data from the reader, it transmits certain information to a authenticated tag.
The channel between the reader and the database is considered as secure. In this
paper, it is assumed that an adversary has the following capabilities:
– Eavesdropping: An attacker has a capacity to eavesdrop messages between
the reader and the tags due to an insecure channel, then uses the intermediate
information or useful responses to try certain enhanced attacks, such as
location tracing or a spoofing attack. Therefore, an RFID system should at
least protect against information leakage in an insecure channel.
– Transmitting a malicious message or replaying: It is assumed that an
adversary has the capability to transmit certain malicious messages to the
tag or the reader. By transmitting these messages, the attacker can perform
a spoofing attack or replay attack.
– Interrupting a message: The communication messages between the tags
and the reader can be blocked by an attacker. As a result, a message interrupt
attack can bring into desynchronization state between the tag and the reader,
due to an abnormal closing of a session, malicious blocking of messages, or
different updating of ID between the tag and the database. Furthermore,
several successive message interrupts can be used by an attacker in location
tracing a target tag.
Since the communication between the reader and the tag is performed using
an wireless RF interface, the communicated data can easily be tapped by an
attacker. The various security threats that can occur with an insecure channel
are categorized as follows:
– Information leakage: One RFID privacy problem is information leakage
about a user’s belongings. For example, a user may not want certain informa-
tion known by others, such as ownership of expensive products, identification
of personal medicine, and so on.
– Impersonation attack: After an adversary sends a malicious query to a
target tag, they collect the responses emitted by the tag. The attacker can
then impersonate the reader using the messages collected from the tag. Con-
versely, an adversary can replay the reader’s query to impersonate the target
tag. An attacker can also impersonate a legal tag or reader by replaying cer-
tain useful messages.
– Desynchronization attack: If the current ID for a tag is different to
the one in the database, this is referred to as a state of desynchronization.
An adversary can block certain transmitted messages between the tag and
the reader, creating a dysynchronization state. This state can occur in an
ID-renewable RFID system. If the ID of a tag is desynchronized, the tag
can be easily traced, as one of emitted values from the tag will be constant,
thereby compromising the location privacy.
– Location tracing attack: Here, the adversary can seek some useful infor-
mation on a tag’s location trace. This attack is essentially applied to a rigid
RFID system in which certain communication messages between the tag and
the database are identical to those used in the previous session.
3 Review of OHLCAP
This section briefly reviews Choi et al.’s One-way Hash based Low-Cost Authen-
tication Protocol(OHLCAP).
Database Reader Tag
Database field Tag field
[GIi][K][IDij ][Sij ] [ID][GI][K][S][c]
Query, r−−−−−−→ A1 = K ⊕ c
A2 = ID + (GI ⊕ r ⊕ c)
B = H(ID‖(S ⊕GI)‖(r ⊕ c))
Computes c
A1,A2,BR,r←−−−−−−−− A
1,A2,BR←−−−−−−− B = BL‖BR
Computes IDs for every GIi
Finds ID and checks GI
B = H(ID‖(S ⊕GI)‖(r ⊕ c))
Checks BR
BL−−−−−−−→ BL−−−−−−→ Checks BL
Fig. 1. OHLCAP: One-way Hash-based Low-Cost Authentication Protocol.
3.1 Notations
H() : one-way hash function,H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
IDij : identity of jth tag in ith group, l bits
Sij : secret key for jth tag in ith group, l bits
GIi : ith group index, l bits
K : common secret key in DB and all tags, l bits
r : random number generated by reader,
t : random number generated by tag, l bits
c : counter stored in tag, l bits
Query : request generated by reader
BR : right half of message B
BL : left half of message B
xp : value of x in previous session
xc : value of x in current session
+ : modular addition by mod (2l − 1)
⊕ : exclusive-or(xor) operation
|| : concatenation of two inputs
3.2 Description of OHLCAP
OHLCAP consists of a set-up and mutual authentication phase, as described in
Fig. 1.
1) Set-up phase:
– Back-end database: Divides all the tags into n groups, which include m tag
identities. The data field of the back-end database is GIi||K||IDij ||Sij .
– Tag: A tag is initialized by a data field, including ID||GI||K||S and a counter
c, where K is the same in all tags and GI is the same within a group.
2) Authentication phase:
– Step 1. The reader sends a Query and r to a tag.
– Step 2. The tag computes A1, A2 and B, then sends them to the reader. The
tag increases the counter c whenever it receives a query from the reader.
– Step 3. Upon receiving A1, A2, and BR from the tag, the reader forwards
them with r to the back-end database.
– Step 4. The back-end database computes c′ = A1⊕K and ID′i = A2−(GI ′i⊕
r ⊕ c′) using all the group indices GI ′i, i ∈ {1, . . . n}. If one of the computed
ID′i matches one of the stored IDs, the back-end database checks if one of
the computed ID′is matches one of the stored IDs, the back-end database
then checks whether the GI ′i contains the ID
′
i matching that for the true
GIi group. The back-end database authenticates the tag by checking that
the computed BR equals the received one, then sends the BL to the reader.
– Step 5. The reader forwards the BL to the tag
– Step 6. The tag authenticates the reader by checking the BL.
4 Security Analysis of OHLCAP
This section analyzes the security weaknesses of OHLCAP and provides attack
details.
4.1 Traceability using Counter Information
With OHLCAP, when responding to a query from the reader, the tag computes
A1 = K ⊕ c using a counter c. At this point, an adversary can trace a tag if the
tag’s messages are caught in two successive sessions. The following explains how
OHLCAP is vulnerable to location tracing.
– Assumption: It is supposed that an adversary knows certain tag’s responses
from two successive sessions, A1p = K ⊕ cp and A1c = K ⊕ cc. Here, the
relationship between the two counters is cc = cp + 1.
– Attack: The adversary computes A = A1p ⊕ A1c = cp ⊕ cc. As a result,
the secret key K is removed from the equation. The value A always has a
distinguishable sign, a 1’s-run value from the LSB. Now, the adversary can
trace a tag by observing successive 1-runs from the LSB of A.
For example, if the previous counter value is cp = 1011010111 and the current
one is cc = 1011011000, then A = cp ⊕ cc = 0000001111, which has four 1-runs.
As such, it is easy to determine that A is always one when the LSB of the first
counter cp is zero, i.e. if cp = 1011010110 and the current cc = 1011010111,
then A = 0000000001. Thus, an adversary can trace a tag by observing two
successive responses, A1p and A
1
c . Furthermore, if the counter is a l-bit string,
then the possibility that the target tag and a random tag(with a random counter)
cannot be distinguished is l/2l, which is negligible as a function of l.
Table 1. Possibility of impersonation attack by updating LSB of random number
unknown bit that can differ from
LSB of rp LSB of rc LSB of cp LSB of cc rp ⊕ cp rc ⊕ cc Success
(Known bit) (Update) (Guessing bit) (Current session) Bc = Bp
0 1 0 1 bb..bbb0 bb..bbb0 O
0 1 1 0 with carry bb..bbb1 xx..xxx1 X
b : unknown bit x : unknown bit, it can be different with b
4.2 Impersonation by Maliciously Updating Random Number
Choi et al. claim that reader impersonation is impossible, due to the authentica-
tion process between the reader and a tag, making it impossible for an adversary
to send a correct last BL message to the tag. However, an adversary can imper-
sonate a legal reader using a random number from a previous session as follows:
– Assumption: It is supposed that an adversary catches two messages rp and
BL from the previous session. Also, for the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that the LSB of rp is zero.
– Attack: The adversary generates a malicious random number rc, such as
rc = rp + 1, in the attack session, i.e., the LSB of rp is just changed to
one. After sending a Query and the malicious rc to the tag and receiving
some responses from the tag, the adversary then sends the same BL as used
in the previous session to the tag as the last message. Since the value B is
computed by H(ID‖(S ⊕ GI)‖(r ⊕ c)), if rp ⊕ cp equals rc ⊕ cc, then Bc
is equal to Bp. In this case, the impersonation attack as a legal reader is
successful. When rp ⊕ cp is not rc ⊕ cc, the attack fails.
The following provides more detail on the above impersonation attack. The
tag computes A1, A2, and B in response to the query from the adversary. If rp⊕cp
is equal to rc ⊕ cc, A2c and Bc will be the same as A2p and Bp, respectively,
computed in the previous session. From the relationship of cc = cp + 1 and
rc = rp + 1, if the LSB of rp is zero, the LSB of cp is also zero, then this attack
will be absolutely successful, as rp⊕cp is equal to rc⊕cc. However, if the LSB of
cp is one, such an attack is impossible, as r1⊕c1 is not equal to r2⊕cc. Therefore,
an adversary can impersonate the reader by sending the random number updated
by one and the last BL message used in the previous session. The possibility of
success is 1/2 when the adversary chooses a previous random number, rp, where
the LSB is a zero bit. Table 1 outlines the possibility of an impersonation attack
based on maliciously updating the LSB of a random number.
4.3 Physical Attack on Tag
When considering the case of an adversary obtaining the secret key K and group
key GIi by physically attacking a tag, Choi et al. claim that the adversary cannot
trace the target tag, as the secret value S is unknown, however, tracing is possible
without considering S as follows:
– Assumption: It is assumed that an adversary can eavesdrop on A1, A2, BL
and BR between the reader and the target tag. Furthermore, the secret key
K and group key GIi are known through a physical attack.
– Attack 1: The adversary extracts counter c from A1 using the value K.
• c = A1 ⊕K
Then, even though the secret value S is unknown, the tag counter can be
compared with the previous one. Thus, all tags can be traced by checking the
counter increment by one. Furthermore, if the adversary knows the counter
number for the previous session, a malicious random number rc can be com-
puted, such as rc = (rp ⊕ cp) ⊕ cc and cc = cp + 1. Since the A2 and B in
the attack session are the same as the previous session values, the adversary
can easily impersonate the reader, as described in section 3.2.
– Attack 2: Since an adversary can compute the counter c, as shown above,
the ID can also be extracted from the eavesdropped messages A2 and r.
• ID = A2 − (GIi ⊕ r ⊕ c)
Then, even though the adversary does not know the tag’s secret key S, the
ID can be extracted from every session related to the ith group. Thus, the
adversary can trace a tag by computing the ID for a group that includes a
tag corrupted by a physical attack.
The above attack means that the RFID system is compromised with regard to
traceability, so the RFID tag can no longer be used.
5 Security Enhancement of OHLCAP
To prevent traceability in the case of using counter information, it is recom-
mended that a random number be used in a tag instead of a counter. However,
this requires a random number generator in a tag. Alternatively, a hashed value
of a stored number can be used that is changed in each session. If a random
number or hashed value is used instead of a counter, the first tracing attack and
impersonation attack by maliciously updating the number rc become impossible.
However, if the secret key K and GIi are compromised, then OHLCAP cannot
prevent a tracing attack, as an adversary can compute the counter value from
A1 and fixed ID for a group corrupted by a physical attack.
5.1 Group-based Low-Cost Authentication Protocol
Accordingly, a new authentication protocol is proposed that is based on a group
key. In contrast to OHLCAP, the proposed protocol removes the data fields
for the secret key Sij and counter c due to their uselessness. To protect the
RFID system from the case of K and GIi being compromised, the proposed
protocol computes three messages: A1 = K ⊕ t, A2 = GI + (r ⊕ t), and B =
Database Reader Tag
Database field Tag field
[GIi][K][IDij ] [ID][GI][K]
Query, r−−−−−−→ random number t
A1 = K ⊕ t
A2 = GI + (r ⊕ t)
B = H(ID‖GI‖r‖t))
Computes t = A1 ⊕K A
1,A2,BR,r←−−−−−−−− A
1,A2,BR←−−−−−−− B = BL‖BR
Computes GI = A2 − (r ⊕ t)
Finds ID in GI by checking BR
B = H(ID‖GI‖r‖t)) BL−−−−−−−→ BL−−−−−−→ Checks BL
Fig. 2. Proposed Group based Authentication Protocol.
H(ID‖GI‖r‖t)). As a result, even though K and GIi are compromised, the
attacker can not extract a tag’s ID from B due to the one-way property of the
hash function. Therefore, the proposed group-based protocol is at least secure
from above three attacks. Fig. 2 shows the process of the proposed group-based
authentication protocol, and the following gives a detailed description of each
step.
1) Set-up phase:
– Back-end database: Divides all the tags into n groups. The data field is
GIi||K||IDij .
– Tag: A tag is initialized by a data field, including ID||GI||K.
2) Authentication phase:
– Step 1. The reader sends a Query and r to a tag.
– Step 2. The tag generates a random number t and computes A1 = K ⊕ t,
A2 = GI +(r⊕ t), and B = H(ID‖GI‖r‖t)), then sends A1, A2, and BR to
the reader.
– Step 3. The reader forwards A1, A2, and BR with r to the back-end database.
– Step 4. The back-end database computes t = A1⊕K and GI = A2− (r⊕ t),
then finds the ID in the GI by checking the BR. The back-end database
authenticates the tag by checking that the computed BR equals the received
one, then sends the BL to the reader.
– Step 5. The reader forwards the BL to the tag
– Step 6. The tag authenticates the reader by checking whether the received
BL equals the one computed in Step 2.
5.2 Security and Efficiency Analysis
The security of the proposed protocol was evaluated against the threats described
in Section 2: 1) information leakage, 2)impersonation attack, 3) desynchroniza-
tion attack, and 4) location tracing attack. To obtain secret information from a
tag, an adversary must be able to guess the ID. However, an adversary cannot
compute the ID from the A1, A2, B, and r, due to the security property of a
one-way hash function.
Even when an adversary collects a tag’s responses, then tries to impersonate a
legitimate tag, they cannot compute the hashed messages A1, A2, and B without
knowing the K, GI, and ID values. Meanwhile, to impersonate the reader, an
adversary must send the correct BL. This is also impossible, as it cannot be
computed without knowing the ID value.
In a desynchronization attack, assuming that an adversary blocks the re-
sponse messages transmitted from a tag, i.e., step 2 in Fig. 2, even though the
tag receives the same random number r as in the previous session, the tag sends
A1, A2, and B in the next session as a response to a query. Therefore, the pro-
posed protocol can protect against a desynchronization attack, as the tag does
not emit any useful messages for enhanced attacks, such as location tracing.
In the case of location tracing, the proposed protocol guarantees location
privacy by sending different random messages for each session. After the au-
thentication is finished in the previous session, the tag sends A1, A2, and B in
response to a query in the current session, that is, the same response is not emit-
ted by the tag in the subsequent session. Thus, location privacy is satisfied as
A1, A2, and B are already refreshed in each session using two random numbers.
When evaluating the storage costs and computational load for the DB and
tag, the proposed protocol makes an improvement in the storage costs for theDB
as removing the secret key Sij and the counter for each tag. With the proposed
protocol, the storage size of the DB is 3l ·m, where l is the length of an IDij , K,
or group index GIi and m is the number of IDs. Plus, a tag requires 3l bits of
memory to store an ID, K, and the GI value. The total length of the messages
transmitted from a tag to the reader is 2.5l, while that from the reader to a tag
is 1.5l, except for a Query.
The computational cost in the tag and the DB can be slightly reduced com-
pared to the original OHLCAP. The main processing in a tag is hash operation
like SHA-1[9] which is the most widely used secure hash function. By high design
techniques, SHA-1 needs only 405 clock cycles to compute the hash of 512 bits
of data in the work of Kaps et al. [2], and SHA-256 requires 1,128 cycles in [3].
Therefore, the proposed protocol is also suitable for a lightweight RFID system
with limited memory space and low computational power.
6 Conclusion
This paper revealed several security weaknesses of OHLCAP. Thus, to guarantee
security against various threats, it is recommended that a random number be
used in a tag instead of a counter. If a random number is generated in a tag, a
tracing attack and impersonation attack then become impossible. Furthermore, if
the secret key K andGIi are compromised by a physical attack, OHLCAP cannot
prevent a tracing attack. Thus, a group-based low-cost authentication protocol
is proposed as a more secure version of OHLCAP. The proposed protocol is
robust to most threats, such as information leakage, an impersonation attack,
desynchronization attack, and location tracing attack.
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